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STATE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES FOR GENDER VIOLENCE:
A TOOL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
Julie Goldscheid & Rene Kathawala*

This article focuses attention on state civil rights remedies that
provide a civil cause of action against those who commit acts of genderbased violence and frame the harm as a violation of the survivor’s civil
rights. Though many of these laws long have been on the books, they are
not widely used. The #MeToo movement has rightly focused public
attention on the ways gender violence persists and on the gaps in legal
remedies for survivors. While law and policy-makers work to enact new
laws to fill gaps, existing laws should be invoked to promote
accountability and provide redress for survivors. State and local civil
rights remedies do just that.
In 1994, after four years of hearings, Congress enacted a civil rights
remedy as part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (“VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy”), which provided a private right of action against
an individual who commits an act of gender violence. The law was
modeled after other federal civil rights legislation and authorized a
survivor of gender-motivated violence to bring a civil cause of action
against the individual who committed the harm. The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), struck down the federal
law as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause
powers and of Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. While the law provided redress for survivors during the six
years it was in effect, both preexisting and later-enacted state and local
remedies also provide a private right of action for gender violence as a
civil rights violation. This article reviews those state and local statutes
and the associated case law interpreting them. It demonstrates that
those state and local laws can be more widely used by individuals who
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seek to hold those who commit acts of gender violence accountable.
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, when high-profile and highnet-worth individuals are being held to account, and when reports of
sexual violence that occurs outside traditional employment settings are
capturing public attention, those laws may be of increased utility.
Employment trends leaving fewer workers employed in settings covered
by traditional federal and state anti-discrimination laws expose the gaps
in existing civil rights frameworks and render additional remedies all
the more important. The state laws reviewed here have not been the
focus of much advocacy, scholarship, or litigation. This article advances
an additional and under-utilized theory of recovery for gender violence
survivors that promotes the principles of equality and liberty for which
civil rights long has stood.
INTRODUCTION
The current attention to gender violence raises important and
challenging questions about the power and limits of the law and about
how law and culture interact to produce social change. This moment of
outrage and activism follows over 30 years of advocacy that has
generated a body of federal and state laws, policies, and practices aimed
at prohibiting and providing redress for gender violence. The moment
highlights how deeply gender violence is engrained in our culture and
serves as a reminder that cultural norms have persisted in allowing
gender violence to continue, unmitigated, for years. It provides an
opportunity to consider new ways to challenge cultural norms and to
critically assess how the law can better promote accountability and
provide redress for those who suffer sexual violence and other forms of
gender-related abuse.
Legal remedies are but one tool to address gender violence; they are
by definition limited in their ability to produce deep cultural change. But
law reform remains important as a tool for accountability, as a prod for
policy change, and as a means for redress for those harmed as a result.
Law reform addressing gender violence advanced significantly when the
Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of workplace
discrimination in 1986.1 However, federal antidiscrimination laws do
not reach all employers,2 do not hold the individuals who commit sexual
violence directly accountable,3 and case law has limited the scope of
1. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (“The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.”).
3. See Julie Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34 Fla.
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discrimination claims even for employers within its reach.4
Significantly, as discussed more fully below, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Morrison, invalidated the civil rights remedy enacted as
part of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”); that
provision provided a private cause of action against the person who
committed an act of gender-motivated violence.5
Much of the #MeToo movement’s focus has been directed at the
workplace. At the same time, advocates and policymakers know that
sexual harassment at work is but one form of gender violence. Gender
violence is also prevalent in schools, in public spaces, and in intimate
partner relationships that have no relationship to the workplace.6 Indeed,
many of the high-profile cases recently calling attention to the
persistence of gender violence fall outside the purview of traditional
civil rights laws, which apply primarily to the workplace, to housing, to
educational institutions, and to state actors.7 In response to the #MeToo
St. U. L. Rev. 731, 747 n. 68 (2007); Maya Raghu & JoAnna Suriani, National Women’s Law Center,
#MeTooWhatNext: Strengthening Workplace Sexual Harassment Protections and Accountability, at 3
(last visited July 21, 2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/metoowhatnext-strengthening-workplace-sexualharassment-protections-and-accountability/ (detailing shortfalls in the law and recommended reform).
4. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013) (holding that an employee is a
“supervisor,” and therefore may be vicariously liable for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 only if she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions
against the victim). For discussion of Title VII’s limitations in redressing sexual harassment on the job,
see, e.g., Rebecca H. White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE (2018),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164487 (last visited July 21, 2018).
5. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar sentenced to up to 175 years in prison for decades of
sexual abuse, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/larry-nassar-sentencing/index.html (detailing sexual
abuse by former USA Gymnastics and Michigan State University doctor) (last visited July 21, 2018);
Olivia Fleming, Models Share Stories of Sexual Assault in the Fashion Industry,
http://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a12817440/models-sexual-assault-stories-fashionindustry/ (detailing sexual assault of models and noting that models generally are considered
independent contractors and therefore outside of the reach of most workplace antidiscrimination laws)
(last visited July 21, 2018); Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, The
Silence Breakers, TIME Magazine, Person of the Year 2017, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year2017-silence-breakers/?xid=homepage (celebrating survivors who have come forward) (last visited July
21, 2018); Helen Rosner, The Moral Responsibility of Restaurant Critics in the Age of #MeToo, The
New Yorker (Feb. 15, 2018) https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-gastronomy/the-role-of-therestaurant-critic-in-the-age-of-metoo; Kate Rogers, #MeToo on Main Street: Small businesses can’t
overlook
workplace
harassment,
CNBC,
Make
It
(Feb.
21,
2018)
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/21/metoo-on-main-street-small-businesses-fire-suspendemployees.html, Feb. 21, 2018. See also, e.g., Lesley Wexler, Jennifer Robbennolt, & Colleen Murphy,
#MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, (March 6, 2018), University of Illinois College of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-14, at notes 2 – 38, and accompanying text, available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135442 (reviewing allegations, including, inter alia, those brought against
individuals in industries including politics, entertainment and media, chefs and restaurateurs, venture
capital, academia and the judiciary).
7. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2018) [hereinafter Title
VII]; Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (“Title VI”) (2018)
(prohibiting race discrimination in programs or activities that receive federal funds); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et
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movement, advocates have proposed a number of important reforms to
address gaps in the law, many of which are focused on the workplace.8
As policymakers assess gaps in the law, proposals should take into
account the range of contexts in which gender violence occurs. This
essay focuses on laws framing gender violence as a civil rights violation
and, specifically, on laws that would hold the individual who committed
the harm accountable. While proposals to amend workplace
discrimination laws to more fully cover the harms of discriminatory
harassment at work would go a long way toward advancing workplace
accountability, free standing civil rights laws apply regardless of an
employment context. If part of the goal of legal remedies is to promote
accountability by those who commit harm, individual accountability
should be a core component of a comprehensive liability scheme.
In 1994, after four years of hearings, Congress enacted a civil rights
remedy as part of the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a
private right of action against an individual who committed an act of
gender violence.9 The law was modeled after other federal civil rights
legislation that addressed analogous harms.10 The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Morrison, struck down the federal law as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers and of

seq. (2018) (“Title IX”) (prohibiting sex discrimination in education programs or activities that receive
federal financial assistance); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) [hereinafter Section 1983] (providing cause of
action for violations of constitutional or federal law by state actors).
8. For example, proposals include expanding Title VII to include small businesses, to allow
independent contractors to sue, to hold employers accountable for harassment by a low-level supervisor,
to address secrecy in a variety of forms, and to hold individuals accountable. See, e.g., Raghu & Suriani,
supra note 3 (detailing shortfalls in the law and recommended reform); Margaret E. Johnson, Only 1 in
4 women who have been sexually harassed tell their employers. Here’s why they’re afraid, THE
CONVERSATION (June 5, 2018), http://theconversation.com/only-1-in-4-women-who-have-beensexually-harassed-tell-their-employers-heres-why-theyre-afraid-97436.
9. Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat.
1902, 1941-42 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000), invalidated by Morrison, supra note
5, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 123, 128-180 (1999) [hereinafter
Meaningful Paradigm]. For accounts of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy’s legislative history, see, e.g.,
Sally Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 64 – 78 (2002); Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the
Persistence of Privacy, 102 Ohio St. L. J. 1 (2000); Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship,
and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1,
1-2 (1996); Fred Strebeigh, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 309-445 (2009).
10. For summaries of the law’s purpose and history, see, e.g., supra note 9; for additional
commentary, see, e.g., Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135
(2000); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 619
(2001); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441 (2000); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney,
Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002); Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3; Julie
Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not
Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L. Q. 157, 158 (2005) [hereinafter, Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out].
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Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.11
However, both preexisting and later-enacted state and local remedies
provide a private right of action for gender violence as a civil rights
violation. This article updates a review of those laws published in
2005,12 and argues that these state laws can be more widely used by
individuals who seek to hold those who commit acts of gender violence
accountable through civil remedies.
Part I provides a background of the 1994 federal civil rights remedy
and of subsequent efforts to introduce a revised federal remedy after the
United States v. Morrison decision. Part II reviews the state statutes
providing civil remedies for gender violence and their associated case
law. This article concludes with recommendations about how these laws
can be used to promote accountability and provide redress for survivors,
as part of the current wave of efforts to end gender violence.
I. Background: The Federal Civil Rights Remedy and Its Aftermath
Since the purpose, history, and use of the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy has been well documented elsewhere,13 this section will offer
only a brief summary. The law was intended to complement
Reconstruction-era and other civil rights statutes by providing a civil
cause of action for other forms of discrimination and bias-motivated
violence, in order to provide a uniform federal law framing gender
violence as a civil rights violation.14 Existing laws would provide at
least some measure of redress for gender violence committed at work,15
committed by state actors,16 or committed by groups of individuals.17
Notwithstanding the formidable limitations of the reach of those laws,
advocates and Congress recognized that no federal law provided a
federal civil rights cause of action for the most common form of gender
violence, that committed by private individuals.18 The goals can be
thought of as two-fold: as a practical tool that would provide a cause of
action for survivors, and as an aspirational, or symbolic remedy that
would more accurately capture the nature of the harm. This re-framing
would transform the terms of debate, would bring public attention to its
11. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
12. Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10. See also, e.g., Andrea Brenneke,
Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 Law & Ineq. 1, 39-43 (1992)
(discussing state civil rights remedies for gender violence).
13. See, e.g., supra notes 9 and 10.
14. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 72-73.
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2018) [hereinafter Title VII].
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
17. 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (2018).
18. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 72-73.
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severity and impact, and would counter the historic gender
subordination that fuels and perpetuates abuse.19
The VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, as enacted, provided a private
right of action for a “crime of violence” that was “gender-motivated.”20
It made clear that a claim would not be dependent on any associated
criminal proceeding and would apply regardless of the relationship
between the parties.21 During the six years the law was in effect, over 60
reported decisions invoked the law.22 The legislative history of the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy directed courts to analyze the two-part
“gender-motivation” requirement in the same way it would assess bias
in other civil rights statutes, by evaluating the “totality of the
circumstances” for evidence such as epithets, patterns of behavior,
statements evincing bias, and other circumstantial as well as direct
evidence.23 Despite concerns before its enactment that the statutory
definitions would preclude relief, most courts recognized that claims
alleging domestic violence and sexual assault satisfied the statutory
elements.24
Nevertheless, challenges to the law’s constitutionality proved
successful, and the Supreme Court struck down the law in United States
v. Morrison.25 The Court deemed the law beyond Congress’ powers
under both the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.26 Following that decision, proposals were introduced in
Congress that would retain the essence of the private right of action but
would include a “jurisdictional element” that would require proof of
economic impact in each case, to address the Morrison Court’s concerns
19. See, e.g., Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3 at 743-45; Goldscheid, Struck
Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10, at 160-65.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), (d)(1) - (2) (1994), overruled by U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000). The statute contained a two-part definition of the term "crime of violence,” under which the
plaintiff first would have to establish that the "act or series of acts . . . would constitute a felony against
the person" or "against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another," 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (d)(2)(A); and that the act came within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994), which is a
federal statute defining “crime of violence.” To establish the “gender motivat[ion]” element, a plaintiff
would have to prove that the act was committed “because of gender or on the basis of gender,” and
“due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender.” 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994)
(subsequently repealed).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) & (2).
22. See, e.g., Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10, at 164-65; Julie
Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Bias Crimes – Charting New
Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 265, 271-83 (2001) (reviewing decisions,
including those interpreting the “crime of violence” and “gender motivation” elements, respectively).
23. See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52-53, 64 (1993); see also, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, GenderMotivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 Harv.
Women’s L.J. 123, 130, 142-48 (1999); Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 271-73.
24. Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 22, at 261, 271-83.
25. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
26. Id. at 617, 627.
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that the 1994 remedy, as written, reached beyond Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers.27 That proposal did not advance in Congress.28
The Morrison Court invited local responses. As Justice Rehnquist
opined:
. . . If the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice
could fail to provide [Christy Brzonkala] a remedy for the
conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system
that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia,
and not by the United States.29
It further opined that it could:
. . . think of no better example of the police power, which the
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims.30
Indeed, a few jurisdictions took up the Court’s invitation to enact
state and local laws.31 California, Illinois, New York City, and
Westchester enacted state and local civil rights remedies modeled after
the federal law.32 However, the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy was not
the first legislative enactment to frame gender violence as a civil rights
violation. State civil rights remedies, many of which were on the books
before VAWA’s enactment, provide civil relief for gender-motivated
violence. Some of those laws are freestanding, and some are linked to
states’ bias crime or civil rights statutes.33 Nevertheless, those laws have
not been widely publicized or widely used.
In the wake of the #MeToo movement, when high-profile and high27. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2000, H.R. 5021, 106th
Cong. (2000).
28. Nothing would preclude reintroduction of the Violence Against Women Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 2000 or a modified version of a similar law. The scope and utility of such a proposal
is beyond the scope of this essay.
29. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
30. Id. at 618.
31. See Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, supra note 10, at 165.
32. Id. at note 45 (citing Cal. Civil Code § 52.4 (West 2004); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 82/10
(West 2004); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-901 (2000); Westchester County, NY, Laws of Westchester
County ch. 701 (2001), and noting that New York City’s City Council expressly referenced the
Morrison decision in its legislative findings stating that it enacted this law “[i]n light of the void left by
the Supreme Court’s decision,” to ensure that victims had an “officially sanctioned and legitimate cause
of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from gender-motivated violence.” N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 8-902 (2000)).
33. For a review of those laws as of 2005, see, e.g., Goldscheid, Struck Down but Not Ruled Out,
supra note 10. See also infra Section II.B.
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net-worth individuals are being held to account, and when reports of
sexual violence that occur outside traditional employment settings are
capturing public attention, those laws may be of increased utility.
Employment trends leaving fewer workers employed in settings covered
by traditional federal and state antidiscrimination laws expose gaps in
existing civil rights frameworks and render additional remedies all the
more important.34
II. Survey of State Civil Rights Remedies
State civil rights remedies providing a private cause of action against
someone who has committed an act of gender-motivated violence take
several different approaches. They can roughly be categorized as
follows: (1) laws enacted after United States v. Morrison, which track
the general structure of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy; and (2) civil
remedies provided as part of or in connection with the state’s civil rights
laws, which are framed as: (a) those providing a civil cause of action for
bias-motivated violence or intimidation based on a protected category,
including “sex” or “gender;” and (b) those providing a civil cause of
action for interference with other state or federal rights, which include
the right to be free from gender-based violence.35 This section will
discuss each in turn.36
A. Post-Morrison Provisions Modeled on VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy37
1. California
California’s anti-gender violence statute, enacted in response to the
Morrison decision, provides redress virtually identical to the prior
34. See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, Freelanced: The Rise of the Contract Workforce,
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/578825135/rise-of-the-contract-workers-work-is-different-now, NPR
(Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing NPR/Marist poll finding that one in five jobs in America is held by a worker
under contract).
35. This review of state laws includes those that apply to gender violence committed at work or
in educational institutions, but that are not limited to those settings. It does not survey the statutory
frameworks available in every state specifically providing redress for sex discrimination, including
sexual harassment and assault, at work or in educational institutions. Although some of those
employment discrimination statutes allow for individual liability, their main focus is on institutional, not
individual, accountability.
36. In addition, see the attached Appendix A, listing each state’s statute with the associated
citation, for easy reference.
37. In addition to the statutes discussed below, Minnesota’s statute providing a civil remedy for
bias-motivated violence tracks the structure of the VAWA Civil Rights Remedy, even though it was
enacted while VAWA was still in effect. See infra notes 132 to 135 and accompanying text.
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VAWA remedy. The statute affords a right of action for victims of
gender violence and authorizes recovery of damages, injunctive relief,
and related attorney fees in a civil suit against the individual who
committed harm.38 Though the case law interpreting this statute is
limited, it provides some insight into how courts may interpret the
statutory requirements.39 The statute sets out two alternative bases for
establishing a claim: either (1) a criminal offense involving the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force where the offense was
committed, at least in part, based on the gender of the victim; or (2) the
physical intrusion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions. 40 A few
decisions have interpreted the first definition, in which claims would be
based on an underlying criminal offense with physical force that is
based in part on gender animus. In F.P. v. Monier, the California
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s judgment that the plaintiff had
alleged the requisite criminal offense.41 The decision was based on
numerous allegations, including that the 17-year old defendant had
molested plaintiff numerous times when she was 10 years old and that
he committed acts of unlawful penetration, sodomy, and oral
copulation.42
Neither of the two other reported decisions analyzing this element
found it to be satisfied. In Harper v. Lugbauer, the plaintiff alleged that
38. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4 (2002). The statute defines “gender” to mean sex and also includes a
person’s gender identity and gender expression. “Gender expression” means a person’s gender-related
appearance and behavior, whether or not stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at
birth. The statute defines gender violence as a form of sex discrimination and specifies that a claim be
based on either (1) one or more acts that would constitute a criminal offense under state law that has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force where the offense was committed,
at least in part, based on the gender of the victim; or (2) the physical intrusion of a sexual nature under
coercive conditions. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4(c). Victims of gender violence may file a claim in either
superior court or small claims court within three years of the offense (or for minors, the latter of eight
years after the date of majority, or three years from the date that the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered the related injury after reaching majority). The statute also explicitly precludes employer
vicarious liability for the actions of their employees. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4. This enactment
complements other bias-crime-related legislation already in effect in California. See infra Section
II.B.I.a.
39. In a noteworthy decision covering the right of a survivor to bring a gender violence claim in
court, though not interpreting the substantive terms of the civil rights statute, a California appellate court
held that an arbitration agreement covering “any dispute” between a nurse recruiting company and
hospital company arising “out of the services contracted for in” the nurse recruitment contract did not
cover claims by the recruiting company and its chief executive officer against the hospital company and
its vice president for gender-based violence, gender violence, assault, and false imprisonment, arising
from the employees’ intimate relationship; possibility of alleged domestic assault by employee of one
company against employee of the other could not have been within parties’ contemplation at the time of
the agreement, even if it would not have occurred but for the business relationship between companies.
RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West, Cal.Rptr.3d 892 (App. 1 Dist. 2008).
40. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.4 (2002).
41. F.P. v. Monier, 3 Cal. 5th 1099, 1115 (Cal. 2017).
42. Id.
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several defendants, including some of her neighbors and various city
employees, engaged in a criminal conspiracy to sexually assault and
rape the plaintiff, which had occurred many years earlier.43 The court
analyzed the web of defendants and found that the plaintiff did not
provide any evidence tying defendants’ unflattering statements about her
to any genuine issue of fact evincing an agreement by the defendants to
commit any act defined by the statute.44 The court ruled that there were
insufficient facts to establish an underlying criminal conspiracy and,
therefore, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.45
Similarly, in Greenwald v. Bohemian Club, Inc., the plaintiff, a cook
at a private club, alleged three criminal offenses based on a purported
sexual assault and subsequent harassment by the club’s director of
human resources and harassment by other employees. 46 The court
dismissed her sexual assault and battery allegations because they fell
outside of the three-year statute of limitations.47 The court concluded
that the remaining allegation, defendant’s threat to overload the
plaintiff’s work schedule if she filed a complaint, did not satisfy the
statutory requirement of a gender-motivated criminal offense with
physical force.48
With respect to the second means of establishing a claim, courts have
upheld claims based on allegations of physical invasions of a sexual
nature that occurred under coercive conditions, regardless of a particular
showing of gender animus. This showing was established under the
particularly appalling facts presented in F.P. v. Monier, discussed
above.49 Similarly, a California court found a triable issue of fact as to
whether a supervisor coerced the plaintiff into committing sexual acts in
Doe v. Starbucks, Inc.50 There, the minor plaintiff was a barista at a local
Starbucks and claimed that her shift supervisor coerced her into having
repeated sexual encounters with him. The plaintiff alleged that her
supervisor repeatedly asked her out and that she finally said “yes” to
make him stop asking.51 Her supervisor kept demanding sexual favors
and the plaintiff complied because she felt she had to or she would lose

43. Harper v. Lugbauer, No. 11-CV-01306-JST, 2014 WL 1266305, at *17-19 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
21, 2014).
44. Id. at *17.
45. Id. at *18-20.
46. Greenwald v. Bohemian Club, Inc., No. C07-05261 WHA, 2008 WL 2331947, at *1, 4, 5
(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 39, at 1085.
50. Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 08-0582 AG CWX, 2009 WL 5183773, at *1, 4-5 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2009).
51. Id. at *4-5.
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her job.52 Their encounters continued for months and, when a coworker
asked the plaintiff about it, her supervisor yelled at the plaintiff for
confirming it and claimed there was no coercion.53 The court denied the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and the case was later settled out of
court.54 Two additional decisions included Section 52.4 claims based on
coercive sexual intrusion, but the reported decisions did not address the
Section 52.4 claim.55
2. Illinois
The Illinois Gender Violence Act (“IGVA”), enacted in 2004,
provides a private civil cause of action for any person who has been
subjected to “gender-related violence.”56 Although there is not a large
body of case law, a few decisions arose from workplace-related
harassment and a few involved assaults by medical professionals. For
example, in Smith v. Farmstand, the court affirmed a jury verdict for a
male former butcher who sued his former employer and other employees
for race and sex discrimination.57 His IGVA claims against two
employees were based on testimony involving allegations of

52. Id.
53. Id. at *5.
54. Id. at *17.
55. See Kelly v. Cty. of Santa Clara, No. C 04-03676 JW, 2005 WL 588569, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 2005) (plaintiff, who was walking her dog, alleged that police officer ordered her to secure her
dog, hit her from behind, arrested her, and placed her in the back seat of his car where he put his hands
between her thighs and on her breast; defendant moved to dismiss the federal Section 1983 claim and
negligence tort claims and case settled out of court.); Grimes v. Knife River Const., No. CIV. S-1302225 KJM, 2014 WL 1883812, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2014) (plaintiff alleged that her supervisor
had subjected her to sexual harassment, ranging from inappropriate sexual comments to sexual contact,
accompanied by threats to dissuade her from reporting his behavior; reported decision addressed
procedural issues and the case was settled before trial.).
56. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 82/1 (2004), et seq. The IGVA authorizes an award of “damages,
injunctive relief, or other appropriate relief against a person or persons perpetrating” the gender-related
violence. Id. § 82/10. The term “gender-related violence” is defined in the IGVA as: (1) one or more
acts of violence or physical aggression satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of Illinois that
are committed, at least in part, on the basis of a person’s sex, whether or not those acts have resulted in
criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction; (2) a physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual
nature under coercive conditions satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of Illinois, whether or
not the act or acts resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction; or (3) a threat of an act
described in item (1) or (2) causing a realistic apprehension that the originator of the threat will commit
the act. Id. § 82/5. Under Illinois law, “perpetrated” is defined to include “either personally committing
[,] . . . encouraging or assisting” an act of gender-related violence. Id. § 82/10. “Battery” is interpreted to
simply include the unauthorized touching of another person. Luss v. Vill. of Forest Park, 377 Ill. App.
3d 318, 331, 878 N.E.2d 1193, 1204 (2007). Accordingly, it appears that any type of direct, assisted, or
encouraged gender-based violence involving physical contact is a battery falling within the purview of
the IGVA.
57. Smith v. Farmstand, No. 11-CV-9147, 2016 WL 5912886, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016)
(claim involving harassment by a man of a male).
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inappropriate touching of a sexual nature.58 Similarly, a federal district
court in Zamudio v. Nick & Howard LLC denied an employer’s motion
to dismiss IGVA claims based on allegations that “going up the skirts of
female employees was [Defendant’s] preferred method of harassment,”
and that other female employees were subjected to similar lewd
touching and unwelcome sexual advances.59
Other decisions involve sexual assaults by medical professionals. In
Flores v. Santiago, an appellate court upheld plaintiff’s claims for
common law battery and violation of the IGVA based on allegations that
during her visits to the defendant doctor’s office, he doped her with
narcotics and engaged in sexual relations.60 Similarly, in Johnson v.
David, the court upheld an IGVA claim based on allegations that the
pre-employment physical exam to which the plaintiff was subjected was
substantially different than what was required, specifically, “because the
penile portion of the examination was not a necessary part of the
examination and did not relate to anything a correctional officer would
be doing in his line of work.”61
Other decisions confirm that the term “person” under the IGVA is
limited to natural persons, meaning that the IGVA does not apply to
corporations and that a cause of action may only be brought against an
“individual human being.”62 In Doe ex rel. Smith v. Sobeck, the guardian
of a developmentally disabled female participant in a developmental
training program brought an action against the program’s management
under the IGVA and other federal and state laws.63 The complaint
alleged that the program’s management had failed to separate and
protect the female participant from the advances and ultimate rape
committed by a male participant in the program.64 After noting that the
IGVA does not apply to corporations, the court reasoned that a claim
could be alleged against the individual managers if they “personally
encouraged or assisted” in an act of gender-related violence, but that

58. Id.
59. Zamudio v. Nick & Howard LLC, No. 15 C 3917, 2015 WL 6736679, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
4, 2015).
60. Flores v. Santiago, 986 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 6, (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
61. Johnson v. David, No. 12-CV-1038-SCW, 2017 WL 1090811, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23,
2017).
62. See Doe v. Freeburg Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 70, No. 14-CV-674-NJR-DGW, 2015 WL
3896960, at *4 (S.D. Ill. June 23, 2015) (“The context surrounding the word ‘person’ in the Gender
Violence Act is sufficient to overcome the presumption under the Statute on Statutes that the term
‘person’ includes corporations.”); Fuesting v. Uline, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 739, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(internal quotations omitted); Doe ex rel. Smith v. Sobeck, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1026-1027 (S.D. Ill.
2013).
63. 941 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. Ill. 2013).
64. Id. at 1021-1022.
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plaintiff had failed to plead such a claim.65
3. New York City
In 2000, the New York City Council unanimously passed its Victims
of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act (“GMVA”) to address
“the void” left in light of the Morrison decision.66 In significant ways,
the GMVA goes further than the civil remedy created as part of the 1994
VAWA. For example, it grants a longer statute of limitations (seven
years compared to VAWA’s four).67 It defines a crime of violence to
include misdemeanors (as defined by state or federal law) as well as
felonies.68 Additionally, the GMVA, like other state and local remedies,
allows for recovery of attorneys’ fees and punitive damages, which are
not typically available in tort claims under New York law.69
Nevertheless, limited case law interprets the GMVA. 70 The first
substantive ruling was handed down about two years after it was
enacted, in Cadiz-Jones v. Zambretti.71 The decision was notable in that
it allowed for pending cases under the VAWA civil cause of action to be
continued in state court by interpreting the GMVA to be applicable
retroactively.72 Since then, at least one case differentiated VAWA Civil
Rights Remedy cases that were pending when Morrison was decided,
such as Cadiz-Jones, from other cases where the alleged conduct
occurred prior to the enactment of Local Law 73, but where no VAWA
civil rights claims were pending..73
More recently, a trial court questioned the GMVA’s seven-year
statute of limitations, which was heralded at the act’s passage as crucial
65. Id. at 1027-28.
66. NYC Administrative Code § 8-902 (2000) (declaring legislative intent). The law, NYC
Administrative Code § 8-901 et seq. (2000) [hereinafter “GMVA”], provides for a civil cause of action
for “any person claiming to be injured by an individual who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender” and the relief provided includes: (1) compensatory and punitive damages; (2) injunctive and
declaratory relief; (3) attorneys’ fees and costs; and (4) such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate. See NYC Administrative Code § 8-904. Violence “motivated by gender” is defined as “a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an
animus based on the victim’s gender.” See id. at § 8-903-b.
67. Id. at § 8-905-a.
68. Id. at § 8-903.
69. Id. at § 8-904(3) (authorizing recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs). See Local Domestic
Violence Law Elicits Applause and Questions, 224 N.Y.L.J. p. 5 col. 6 (Dec. 15, 2000).
70. In addition to the decisions discussed below, the court in Cartright v. Lodge, No. 15-CV9939, 2017 WL 1194241 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017), granted a default judgment and assessed damages
in a case based on allegations of violence and intimidation, including claims under the GMVA).
71. No. 123772/00, 2002 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2043, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 2002).
72. Id. at **7-8.
73. See Adams v. Jenkins, No. 115745/03, 2005 WL 6584554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005)
(refusing to apply Local law 73 retroactively).
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since “studies have shown that victims of domestic violence often are
not able to share information regarding their injuries with others until
years later.”74 In Cordero v. Epstein, an alleged child abuse victim
brought claims under Local Law 73 along with other civil claims against
the alleged perpetrator.75 The court dismissed the claim as untimely,
finding that the City Council’s extension of the statute of limitations for
certain intentional torts violated the preemption doctrine.76
A decision in one case involving claims based on multiple allegations
spanning a number of years and several states nevertheless dismissed the
claims. In Gottwald v. Sebert, recording star, Kesha Rose Sebert
(“Ke$ha”) brought claims against her recording company’s executive
and his companies based on allegations of sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and contractual violations.77 The court dismissed the Local
Law 73 claims, all of which were based on actions that took place
outside of New York City and which would have been time-barred
under New York law.78 The court additionally opined that, “[a]lthough
[defendant’s] alleged actions were directed to [plaintiff], who is female,
the [counter claims] do not allege that defendant harbored animus
toward women or was motivated by gender animus” when he allegedly
behaved violently toward plaintiff.79 The court went on to state that
“[e]very rape is not a gender-motivated bias crime,”80 though in so
doing it appeared to reference New York State’s criminal bias crimes
law rather than the VAWA civil rights remedy on which the New York
City law was modeled. The court cited a number of general employment
discrimination cases but not the extensive and analogous case law
interpreting claims of sexual violence and harassment as sex
discrimination.81 Moreover, it ignored the substantial legislative history
discussing and case law interpreting, “gender-motivation” under the
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy while it was in effect.82
Two recent decisions interpreted the New York City law in claims
that could be seen as spurred by the #MeToo movement. In Breest v.
Haggis, a 26-year-old woman who worked as a freelance publicist for a
company that hosts film premiers alleged that she was sexually assaulted

74. See Local Domestic Violence Law Elicits Applause and Question, 224 N.Y.L.J. p. 5 col. 6
(Dec. 15, 2000).
75. 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
76. Id. at 730.
77. Gottwald v. Sebert, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
78. Id. at *9-10.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 22 to 24 (tracing decisions under the VAWA civil rights remedy and
referencing legislative history).
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by the defendant, who was a famous director, producer, and
screenwriter.83 The judge rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss her
GMVA claims and concluded that the allegations of sexual assault, of
comments indicating “disrespect for women,” of the defendant’s
“enjoyment of some level of violence [as] against women,” and lack of
provocation or confusion sufficiently alleged “gender-motivation” as
required by the statute.84
By contrast, the Southern District of New York dismissed claims
brought by a former Fox News correspondent against Fox and Charles
Payne, one of its anchors, based on allegations of sexual assault, rape,
sexual harassment, and other claims.85 With respect to the GMVA
claims, the trial court concluded that the allegations failed to state any
facts showing defendant’s “hostility based on gender” or any allegations
that the defendant “harbored or expressed any animosity toward
women.”86 In employing that reasoning, the court disregarded the City
Council’s legislative history that the GMVA was enacted to fill the void
left by Morrison.87 Additionally, it ignored the VAWA civil rights
remedy’s extensive legislative history directing courts to interpret the
“gender motivation” requirement in the same way it would assess bias in
other civil rights statutes.88 That case law makes clear that the statutory
language requiring “animus” was not to be equated with “malicious”
motivation, but instead, confirms that “animus” requires “at least a
purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their sex.”89 Congress
explicitly rejected suggestions to require proof of “animosity;” instead,
it sought, through the “animus” requirement, to dispel suggestions that
disparate impact claims could be brought under the statute.90 Notably,
defendants initially challenged the law’s constitutionality, which led
Public Advocate Letitia James to call for the New York City’s
Corporation Counsel to defend defendant Payne’s constitutional
challenge to Local Law 73; after the Corporation Counsel sought to
intervene to defend the law’s constitutionality, Mr. Payne announced his
decision to drop his constitutional challenge, though he continues to
defend himself on the merits.91

83. Breest v. Haggis, No. 161137/2017 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.) (Complaint) (on file with author).
84. Breest v. Haggist, No. 161137/2017 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Jul. 26, 2018) (transcript p. 71 line 12- p.
73 line 7) (on file with author).
85. Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
86. Id. at 454-56.
87. See supra note 66 (referencing City Council’s legislative history).
88. See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 52-53, 64 (1993); see also, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 9 at 130,
142-48; Goldscheid & Kaufman, supra note 22 at 271-73.
89. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993).
90. See NOURSE, supra note 9, at 29-33 (recounting legislative history).
91. See Kelly Mena, PA James Victory: City’s Victims Protection Law Upheld, KINGS COUNTY
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4. Westchester County
Following New York City’s lead, in 2001, the County of Westchester
enacted a Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection act
(“VGVP”)92 that is very similar to New York City’s Local Law 73,
although unlike Local Law 73, the VGVP does not expressly provide for
a longer statute of limitations. To date, there are no reported decisions
interpreting the Westchester law.
5. Rockland County
Like New York City and Westchester County, Rockland County also
enacted a civil rights remedy for gender violence, modeled after the
federal law.93 In the sole publicly-available decision interpreting the law,
a federal district court held that the law was not unconstitutionally
vague.94 Critical to the court’s conclusion was the defendant’s failure to
offer authority in support of his argument that gender animus, or
motivation, cannot be determined as a factual matter.95
B. Civil Remedies for Gender Violence in State Bias Crime
Provisions
State statutes providing a private right of action for bias-motivated
violence often are part of the state’s civil rights laws. Those laws can
roughly be grouped into two categories: (1) those framed in terms of
civil remedies enacted as part of the state’s anti-bias crime provisions
and civil rights statutes encompassing violence or intimidation
motivated by “sex” or “gender;” and (2) those framed more generally in
terms of civil remedies for damage resulting from violations of, or
interfering with, state or federal rights. This section reviews those laws
and the caselaw interpreting them. It does not address statutory
provisions providing civil remedies for bias-motivated violence based
on characteristics other than gender.96 Nor does it review laws providing
POLITICS (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.kingscountypolitics.com/pa-james-victory-citys-victimsprotection-law-upheld/; see also Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-07093-WHP
(S.D.N.Y.
filed
Feb.
19,
2018),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blic/document/X1Q6NTAUQ282?documentName=60.pdf&fm
t=pdf (withdrawing defendant’s constitutional challenge following City of New York’s request to
intervene in support of the law’s constitutionality).
92. See Westchester County, NY., Code of Ordinances § 701.01 (2001).
93. Rockland County, N.Y., Admin. Code § 279-3 (2001).
94. See Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11 Civ. 8573, 2012 WL 6965719, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012).
95. Id. at *2-3.
96. Notably, a few states provide civil remedies as part of their bias-crime statutes for biasmotivated violence based on protected characteristics, including race, color, gender identity and sexual
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a criminal remedy or that authorize sentence enhancement for criminal
prosecutions based on bias-motivated violence, even when the violence
is based on gender.97
1. Private right of action for gender-based violence or intimidation
a. California
In addition to and preceding the post-Morrison legislation discussed
above,98 California law provides a civil remedy for bias-motivated
violence as part of its “hate crime” law. In 1976, the California
Legislature enacted the Ralph Act as Section 51.7 of its civil code,
thereby providing civil redress for gender violence and also creating a
new right to be free from violence.99 Approximately 50 written decisions
consider gender bias-based claims under this statute; however, only a
few decisions interpret the key statutory elements: (1) the act of
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, and (2) whether the act
was motivated by the victim’s identity in a listed protected class.
A recent decision easily found that allegations of sexual abuse and
rape satisfy both elements of the statute. In Roe v. California
Department of Developmental Services, the court upheld the civil rights
claims on behalf of a woman with developmental disabilities and mental
illnesses who had been sexually assaulted by the “psychiatric
orientation, but not sex or gender. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571c (2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.690
(2014); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.155, 166.165 (2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-35(a) (2014).
97. For examples of statutes providing criminal penalties or sentence enhancements, but not civil
remedies, for “hate crimes” based on sex or gender, see, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §41-1750(A)(3) (2018);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706-662 (1972); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 9:2799.2 (2017); Md. Crim. Law Code § 10-304
(2009); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.523 (2016); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 574.085 (2017); N.H. Stat. § 651:6 (2018);
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 31-18B-3 (2007); N.D. Stat. § 12.1-14-04 (2017); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.014
(2017); Wy. Stat. Ann. §6-9-102 (2001); see also, e.g., M.G.L.A. ch. 265 §39 (2014) (providing
sentence enhancement for bias crimes based, inter alia, on gender identity and sexual orientation, but
not “sex” or “gender”).
98. See supra Section II.A.1.
99. Cal. Civ. Code 51.7(a) (2015). The law provides, in pertinent part, that: “All persons within
the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of
violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of
any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or (e) of Section 51, or position in a labor dispute,
or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics. The
identification in this subdivision of particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than
restrictive.” Id. Section 51, subdivision (b) also provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every
kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code 51(b). A person aggrieved by a violation of the Ralph Act may bring a
civil action within three years of the alleged act to recover actual damages, a civil penalty of $25,000,
exemplary damages, and an award of attorney fees. Cal. Civ. Code 52(b).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5

188

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

technician” assigned to work with her in her residential facility.100 The
court concluded that “rape is considered a ‘violent’ offense . . .
regardless of whether the defendant employed physical force.”101 It
dismissed arguments that the rape was not “because of gender” as “a
silly argument,” citing Title VII and VAWA civil right remedy cases
similarly recognizing sexual assault and rape as gender based crimes.102
Courts analyzing other allegations of gender violence have parsed the
elements more closely. For example, courts have found the first element
satisfied where facts alleged violence or threats of violence. For
example, in Winarto v. Toshiba America Electronics Components, Inc.,
a female employee brought a claim against her employer alleging gender
violence on the basis that her coworker often kicked her, feigned kicking
her, called her “chick,” said “I’m going to hurt you again, Chick,”
messed up her hair claiming it was a “girl thing,” and grabbed
handkerchiefs from her pocket.103 The court found that violence was
committed where at least one instance of kicking was undisputed and
where several more acts were alleged.104 Although the acts of violence
in Winarto involved acts of kicking, the court confirmed: “there is no
requirement that the violence be extreme or motivated by hate in the
plain language of the sections, or in the cases construing them; there is
also no requirement that the act constitute a crime.”105
The Winarto court articulated a “reasonable person” standard for
determining whether a plaintiff was intimidated by a threat of
violence.106 There, the court found that the plaintiff was intimidated by a
threat of violence from the fact that she was injured while trying to run
away from the defendant after the defendant said, “Chick, you’d better
walk faster or I am going to hurt you again.”107 The court also noted that
after being exposed to the defendant’s acts of violence, it was reasonable
for her to be intimidated by his later, less violent acts of invading her
personal space and touching her.108
Similarly, in Hern, the plaintiff claimed gender violence based on
several incidents of her neighbor spitting in her direction, following her,
telling her that he was “watching” her, and leaving decapitated rats on
her patio.109 The court found that the jury was permitted to consider the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

No. 16-cv-03745, 2017 WL 2311303 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-11.
Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1290 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Hern v. McEllen, No. A125358, 2011 WL 2112538, *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 2011)
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defendant’s entire course of conduct as it relates to the plaintiff’s
gender—it need not limit its consideration to acts that
contemporaneously referenced plaintiff’s gender.110
Notwithstanding the Winarto court’s caution, at least one court
interpreted the case to require a threatened use of physical force in order
to establish “intimidation by threat of violence.” In Greenwald, a former
catering employee filed Section 51.7 gender violence claims alleging
sexual harassment by her supervisor, based on allegations including:
battery from an incident where her coworker rammed her with a serving
cart; harassment based on management’s intentional duties to perform
physically demanding tasks after knowing about a work-related injury;
and harassment by her supervisor threatening to overload her work
schedule.111 However, the statute of limitations had run on all claims
except for those based on the supervisor’s threat to overload her work
schedule, which the court found did not satisfy the statutory
requirement.112
Another court rejected a claim based on allegations that a landlord’s
manager entered a tenant’s apartment and sniffed her underwear.113 The
court rejected plaintiff’s contention that “a jury should decide whether
they ‘could reasonably fear rape or other sexual attack by [the
landlord’s] resident male manager’ as a result of his conduct.”114 The
court found that although the defendant entered the apartment and
sniffed her underwear, the defendant did not express any intention to
inflict injury on plaintiffs or their property. 115 The court ruled that
“[t]here can be no ‘threat of violence’ without some expression of intent
to injure or damage plaintiffs or their property.”116
Similarly, a court rejected a claim where there was no indication of
violence. In Gabrielle A., a married couple sued the county and
individual social workers for claims including negligent supervision,
hiring, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of their
civil rights after their two children were detained while waiting for their
juvenile dependency case to be transferred to a different venue.117 With
respect to their civil rights claims, the court concluded that plaintiffs

(finding evidence of intimidation by threat of violence when the defendant followed the plaintiff,
warned her that he was “watching” her, and left a decapitated rat on her patio).
110. Id. at *4-5.
111. Greenwald v. Bohemian Club, Inc., No. C 07-05261 WHA, 2008 WL 2331947, *16 (N.D.
Cal. June 4, 2008).
112. Id. at *25-26.
113. Ramirez v. Wong, 188 Cal. App. 4th 1480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
114. Id. at 1486.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1268, 1281 (Cal Ct. App. 2017).
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offered no evidence to establish defendants discriminated against them
and consequently dismissed their claims.118
When examining the second element of motivation, courts have
recognized circumstantial evidence to support claims that the defendant
directed his actions based on the victim’s class-based identity. A single
statement made during an incident may be enough. In Myers, the court
determined that plaintiff’s testimony that a police officer’s reference to
her as an “ugly white bitch” during an incident was sufficient evidence
for a jury to conclude that race and sex were motivating factors for the
police officer’s conduct.119
In Hern, described above, the court found that a jury could have
inferred that a neighbor’s repeated threatening interactions and
demeaning gender-based comments confirmed that plaintiff’s gender
was a principal motivation for his conduct.120 The court ruled that jurors
could consider the defendant’s entire course of conduct towards a
plaintiff, apart from the defendant’s conduct committed
contemporaneously with the act.121 Similarly, in Winarto, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it was reasonable to infer that gender
was a motivating factor because it was undisputed that the defendant
derisively called the plaintiff a “chick” and messed with her hair
claiming that it was a “‘girl thing.’”122 Conversely, courts have rejected
claims where the complaint contained only conclusory allegations of
discriminatory prejudice.123
b. Illinois
The Illinois Hate Crime Act (“IHCA”) provides that, independent of
any criminal prosecution, anyone suffering personal injury or property
damage as a result of a bias crime may bring a civil suit for actual
damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive
relief.124 Thus, under the IHCA, a plaintiff states a civil claim if he or
118. Id. at 1291.
119. Myers v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, No. C 08-1163 MEJ, 2012 WL 4111912, *31 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 18, 2012).
120. Hern, supra note 109, at *14.
121. Id. at *12.
122. Winarto, supra note 103, at 1290.
123. See Sullivan v. City of San Rafael, No. C 12-1922 MEJ, 2012 WL 3236058, *9 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 6, 2012) (finding no claim where plaintiff did not plead any facts to support allegations that police
officers were motivated by animus against the plaintiff’s homosexuality); Rodriguez v. City of Fresno,
819 F. Supp. 2d 937, 953 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that although the complaint alleged in conclusory
manner that plaintiff was subjected to unreasonable force because of her “race and/or gender,” the
complaint did not allege any facts to substantiate the claim).
124. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-7.1(c) (1995). See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann 12-7.1 (2018) for full
text of civil provision of Illinois’ bias crime law. Courts interpreting the state’s bias crime law have held
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she alleges injury from an assault or battery that was motivated because
of his or her actual or perceived gender.125 No reported decisions apply
the civil provision to gender-based violence claims.
c. Iowa
Iowa grants a civil remedy for gender violence that violates its bias
crime statute.126 However, no reported decisions apply the civil
provision to gender-based violence claims.127
d. Michigan
In Michigan, individuals who violate the state’s ethnic intimidation
statute may be civilly liable to their victims.128 The statute encompasses
bias crimes based on gender129 and can be brought “regardless of the
existence or result of any criminal prosecution.”130 A gender violence
survivor bringing a civil claim under Michigan’s ethnic intimidation
statute may seek an injunction, actual damages (including damages for
emotional distress), or other applicable relief.131 Despite the availability
of a civil cause of action for gender-violence survivors, no reported
decision addresses claims brought by such survivors under the ethnic
intimidation statute.
e. Minnesota
In Minnesota, gender violence survivors have a civil cause of action
that bias need not have been the sole motive for the conduct. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 674 N.E.2d 895,
898 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (affirming battery conviction of white defendant who uttered racial slur, despite
evidence that black victim had provoked the defendant); In re Vladimir P., 670 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
125. Abdoh v. City of Chicago, 930 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
126. See Iowa Code Ann. § 729A.5 (1992). Accordingly, “[a] victim who has suffered physical,
emotional, or financial harm as a result of a violation of this chapter due to the commission of a hate
crime is entitled to and may bring an action for injunctive relief, general and special damages,
reasonable attorney fees, and costs” within two years after the date of the violation. Id. Iowa’s bias
crime statute provides that, inter alia, “[p]ersons within the state of Iowa have the right to be free from
any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because
of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or
disability.”
127. Cf., e.g., Arrington ex rel. Arrington v. City of Davenport, 240 F. Supp. 2d 984, 993 (S.D.
Iowa 2003) (granting summary judgment for defendants for civil claim under § 729A.5 alleging racially
biased violence by police officer where court found no evidence of racial motivation).
128. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.147b(3) (2014).
129. Id. at § 750.147b (1).
130. Id. at § 750.147b (3).
131. Id. (the amount of damages may include both the greater of triple the actual damages or
$2,000.00 and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs).
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for damages against their aggressors under the state’s bias-offense
statute.132 This statute, which was enacted before the Morrison decision,
tracks the structure of the VAWA civil rights remedy, though it also
encompasses civil claims for violence based on a number of protected
categories in addition to “sex.”133 Survivors may bring civil claims
regardless of whether a criminal proceeding was pursued.134 To prevail,
a gender-violence survivor must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the aggressor’s violence constitutes a crime and that this
violence was committed “because of” the survivor’s gender.135 Despite
the availability of a civil cause of action for gender violence survivors,
no reported decision addresses claims brought by such survivors under
the bias-offense statute.
f.

Nebraska

In Nebraska, individuals who violate the state’s discrimination-based
offenses statute, which includes gender, may be civilly liable to their
victims.136 Despite the availability of a civil cause of action for gender
violence survivors, no Nebraska case law addresses claims brought by
such survivors.137

132. The bias crime statute provides, inter alia, for a civil cause of action against those who
committed a bias crime; it defines a “bias offense” as “conduct that would constitute a crime and was
committed because of the victim’s or another’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, disability[,] . . . age, or national origin”; the statute authorizes compensatory damages,
including emotional distress damages, as well as injunctive or other appropriate relief, and has a six-year
statute of limitations. Minn. Stat. § 611A.79 (2014).
133. Id.
134. Id. at § 611A.79.3.
135. Id. at § 611A.79.1, .79.3. Cf., e.g., Disability Support All. v. Billman, No. 15-3649
(JRT/SER), 2016 WL 755620, *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2016) (employment case dismissed where
plaintiffs pleaded no facts suggesting that defendant’s “alleged conduct in violation of the ADA and the
MHRA was committed because of [plaintiff’s] disability. The ‘because of’ language in the statute
required plaintiffs to prove at least something about the defendant’s state of mind at the time he
committed the act in question.”).
136. See Neb. Rev. St. § 28-113 (2014) (providing, inter alia, for general and special damages,
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence “that the
defendant committed the criminal offense against the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property because of the
plaintiff’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability or
because of the plaintiff’s association with a person of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability”; and providing a four-year statute of limitations).
137. Cf. State v. Duncan, 293 Neb. 359, 370-72 (2016) (phrase “because of,” in statute providing
enhanced penalties for third-degree assault and other offenses committed because of a person’s
association with a person of a certain sexual orientation requires state to prove that defendant would not
have assaulted victim but for victim’s association with person of a certain sexual orientation, and
evidence was sufficient to support verdict that defendant would not have assaulted victim but for
victim’s association with people who were homosexual, as would support application of sentencing
enhancement.).
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g. New Jersey
New Jersey’s bias crime law, enacted in 1993, authorizes a victim of
gender violence to bring a civil lawsuit for damages against the
perpetrator.138 The sole decision to address the law’s substantive
elements is Hunt v. Callahan.139 The court affirmed the dismissal of an
employment-based harassment claim after concluding that the plaintiff’s
supervisor “did not use offensive language” and therefore did not intend
to “intimidate” her based on her gender.140 In addition, the court opined
that “[the supervisor] was merely voicing his opinion regarding acts he
believed [the plaintiff] had engaged in and a political philosophy to
which he believed she subscribed.”141 The only other reported decision
addressing gender-based claims dismissed the “bias crime” allegations
since the plaintiffs also brought claims under New Jersey’s Law Against
Discrimination.142
h. New York State
In New York, individuals who commit bias-motivated violence may
be civilly liable to their victims.143 Only one publicly-available case
invokes this provision. In Friedlander v. Waroge Met. Ltd., a lesbian
woman alleged that she was assaulted by a restaurant’s manager and
patrons due to her perceived sexual and gender identities.144 No
138. N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-21(a) (2015) provides in relevant part that a “person, acting with purpose
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of . . . gender [or] gender identity or
expression . . . who engages in conduct that is an offense under [New Jersey’s criminal code] . . .
commits a civil offense” and that “any person who sustains injury to person or property as a result of a
violation” of the statute “shall have a cause of action against the person or persons who committed the
civil offense resulting in the injury.” Id. at § 2A:53A-21(b). The statute requires proof by a
preponderance of the evidence and allows for damages, including emotional distress damages, punitive
damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at § 2A:53A-21(d)(1). The Attorney General for the State of
New Jersey may bring a civil claim against any person who violates the law in addition to the
survivor/victim. Id. at § 2A:53A-21(c). In addition, the law provides for “injunctive relief as the court
may deem necessary to avoid the defendant’s continued violation.” Id. at § 2A:53A-21(d)(3).
139. Docket No. A-2780-11T3, 2012 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2458, at *10 (App. Div. Nov. 5,
2012).
140. Id. at *10-11.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Massey, No. 07-3604 (PGS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23578, *20-21 (D.
N.J. Mar. 26, 2009).
143. See N.Y. Civ. Rights L. § 79-n (McKinney 2015) (providing that a person who suffers
damages to property, physical injury, or death “in whole or in substantial part” because of a belief or
perception on the part of a perpetrator regarding the victim’s race, color, national origin, ancestry,
gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person, regardless of
whether the belief or perception is correct, may bring a civil action for injunctive relief, damages, or any
other appropriate relief in law or equity against the person who “intentionally selects” the person or
property for harm).
144. No. 017910/2011, (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty.).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

23

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 5

194

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

responsive pleadings were filed, and a default judgment of $25,000 was
eventually granted in Ms. Friedlander’s favor.145
i.

Tennessee

In Tennessee, gender violence survivors have a civil cause of action
for damages against their aggressors under the state’s malicious
harassment statute.146 Despite the availability of a civil cause of action
for gender violence survivors, no Tennessee case law addresses claims
brought by such survivors under the malicious harassment statute.
j.

Vermont

In Vermont, gender violence survivors have a civil cause of action
against the individual who committed a gender-based bias crime.147
Vermont case law has not yet addressed gender violence survivors’ civil
claims against their aggressors under the state’s bias-motivated crime
statute.
k. Washington
In Washington, in addition to a criminal penalty,148 gender-violence
survivors have a civil cause of action for damages against their
aggressors under the state’s malicious harassment statute.149 Despite the
145. See Friedlander v. Waroge Met, Ltd. d/b/a/ Sizzler, LAMBDA LEGAL,
https://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/friedlander-v-waroge-met (last visited Mar. 6, 2018); Court
orders Sizzler to pay assault victim, THE TIMES LEDGER (June 20, 2012, 7:25 PM),
http://www.timesledger.com/stories/2012/25/sizzlerbeatdownsettle_fh_2012_06_21_q.html.
146. See Tenn. Stat. § 4-21-701 (2017) (providing for a civil cause of action for malicious
harassment, for both special and general damages, including damages for emotional distress, reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs, and punitive damages). See Washington v. Robertson Cty., 29 S.W.3d 466,
471 (Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that claims of malicious harassment are “found within the Tennessee
Human Rights Act, which, in general, addresses discrimination based on race, . . . sex, gender[.]”).
147. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1457 (2014) (providing civil cause of action for injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, and other appropriate relief,
“[i]ndependent of any criminal prosecution or [its] result[s]” against perpetrator of bias crime). Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 13, § 1455 (2014) prohibits bias-motivated offenses and specifies criminal liability for crimes
“maliciously motivated by the victim’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
ancestry, age, service in the U.S. Armed Forces, disability[,] . . . sexual orientation or gender identity[.]”
In addition, the Attorney General may seek a civil penalty of up to $5,000.00, plus costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees for violation of the state’s bias crime laws. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1466 (2017).
148. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.080 (2010) (providing, inter alia, that a person is guilty
of malicious harassment if “he or she maliciously and intentionally” causes physical injury or damage,
or threatens a specific person or group, because of his or her perception of the victim’s race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap).
149. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.083 (2017) (providing a civil cause of action for
malicious harassment against the harasser for actual damages, punitive damages of up to ten thousand
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availability of a civil cause of action for gender-violence survivors, no
Washington case law addresses claims brought by survivors under this
statute.
l.

Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C. provides a civil remedy to persons incurring an
injury based on an act that demonstrates the accused’s prejudice based
150
on gender, among other protected categories.
The sole reported
decision applying the civil remedy denied the claim for lacking any
151
allegations of bias-based criminal activity.
2. Private right of action for interference with state or federal
rights, including right to be free from gender-based violence.
a. Maine
Maine provides a private right of action for violence or the threat of
violence that interferes with a person’s rights under state or federal
constitutional or statutory laws.152 In sum, this law establishes a civil
cause of action for any person whose state and federal constitutional and
statutory rights have been intentionally interfered with through actual or
threatened violence, damage, destruction of property, or trespass. A
gender-violence survivor bringing a civil claim under Maine’s civil
action statute may seek an injunction, restraining order, and other
dollars, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing the action).
150. See D.C. Code §22-3704 (2009) (providing, inter alia, a civil cause of action “[i]rrespective
of any criminal prosecution or the result of a criminal prosecution,” to a person who incurs injury as a
result of an intentional act that demonstrates an accused’s prejudice based on the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation,
gender identity or expression, family responsibilities, homelessness, physical disability, matriculation,
or political affiliation of a victim, and providing for actual or nominal damages, including damages for
emotional distress, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and injunctive relief). See also D.C.
Code § 22-3703 (criminal sentencing enhancements for bias crimes); Shepherd v. United States, 905
A.2d 260, 263 (D.C. 2006) (not construing the civil remedy, but holding that for the bias crime
sentencing enhancement to apply, the assault had to be based on “the actual or perceived sexual
orientation . . . of the victim” and as applied to the facts of this case appellant’s animus against his
victims’ sexual orientation was evident).
151. See Uzoukwu v. Metro. Wash. Council of Gov’ts, 983 F. Supp. 2d 67, 94-96 (D.C. 2013)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction over § 22-3704 claim as to certain defendants and separately holding
that plaintiff failed to allege any facts indicating bias-based criminal activity against council).
152. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4682 (2014) (providing private right of action against individuals who
intentionally interfere or attempt to intentionally interfere “by physical force or violence against a
person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property or by the threat of physical force or
violence against a person, damage or destruction of property or trespass on property,” of a person whose
rights are secured by the US Constitution or federal law, or rights secured by the Maine Constitution or
state law for legal or equitable relief).
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equitable and legal relief.153 Plaintiffs also have a right to jury trial,
except for hearings regarding preliminary injunctions or temporary
restraining orders.154 The two reported decisions interpreting this
provision have rejected claims based on the absence of cognizable
allegations.155
b. Massachusetts
Massachusetts’ Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”) authorizes civil damages
for bias-motivated threats, intimidation, and coercion that interfere with
civil rights.156 A number of decisions have been brought based on
harassment and assault in the workplace. Although Massachusetts’
workers’ compensation statute precludes a claim in tort for sexual
assault and rape,157 survivors have successfully brought claims arising
from sexual assaults and batteries that violate the employee’s civil
rights.
For example, in O’Connell v. Chasdi, an employee brought civil
rights claims as well as claims of assault, battery, and intentional
inflection of emotional distress against her employer based on a fellow
employee’s sexual harassment on a business trip.158 The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts reversed a judgment in favor of the defendants on the
MCRA claim and found the sexual harassment claim was cognizable
under the MCRA. Similarly, in Wood v. U.S., the court upheld a
plaintiff’s MCRA claim for sexual harassment by an Army major she
worked for as a secretary.159 In Rinsky v. Boston University, the plaintiff
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Fed. Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29, 32 (D. Me. 1995) (granting
defendants’ motion to dismiss in case alleging that job applicant was rejected for a permanent position
because of her gender and also in retaliation with regard to charges she had filed alleging sexual
harassment, concluding that to prevail, a plaintiff “must at a minimum identify a threat of force or
violence”); Curtis v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., No. 05-130-P-H, 2006 WL 662395, **10-11 (D. Me.
Mar. 13, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in hostile environment sexual
harassment claim alleging harassment and concluding that allegations that Plaintiff was teased about the
length of his hair by his coworkers were insufficient to sustain a claim).
156. M.G.L.A. 12 §§ 11H, I, J (2014). Massachusetts civil rights law prohibits, among other
things, bias based on gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation. See, e.g., M.G.L.A. ch. 93 § 102
(providing equal rights to, inter alia, contract, inheritance, convey real estate, to sue and be sued, and
“to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property” based
on, e.g., “sex”). Massachusetts also provides civil remedies as well as sentence enhancement for
criminal penalties for bias crimes based, inter alia, on gender identity. See M.G.L.A. ch. 265 § 39
(2014) (providing for sentence enhancement); M.G.L.A. ch. 266 § 127B (2014) (authorizing civil claims
for violations of section 39).
157. See Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 566 (1996).
158. 400 Mass. 686 (1987).
159. 760 F. Supp. 952 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
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also asserted assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and a claim under the MCRA based on sexual harassment by a
client while working for her employer as a social work intern.160 The
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the MCRA claim,
finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled allegations showing that
the defendants threatened, intimidated, or coerced the plaintiff into
continuing to subject herself to constant sexual harassment from her
client.
c. New York
New York State’s anti-discrimination statute prohibits discrimination
and harassment based on sex, as well as race, creed, color, national
origin, marital status, sexual orientation or disability. 161 This statute
applies the broad anti-discrimination principle to contexts not explicitly
covered by other statutory provisions.162 A federal district court upheld
claims that a high school student and his sister were subjected to
harassment and discrimination based on the student’s sexual
orientation.163 The only other decision invoking this law to address
gender violence dismissed the claim.164
d. North Carolina
In North Carolina, a gender-violence survivor has a civil cause of
action against the aggressor only when the aggressor’s conduct was a
part of a gender-motivated conspiracy of two or more persons to
interfere with the survivor’s constitutional rights and the conduct
“interfere[d], or [was] an attempt to interfere” with the survivor’s
exercise or enjoyment of such rights.165 To prove a conspiracy, a
survivor must show (1) an agreement to commit a crime or wrongful act,
160. No. 10cv10779-NG, 2010 WL 5437289, *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2010).
161. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c (2018).
162. See Wilson v. Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461, 472-73 (N.Y. Sup. 1050) (applying civil rights
statute to discrimination by labor unions notwithstanding lack of explicit prohibition of sex
discrimination in applicable statute).
163. Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
164. See Caballero v. First Albany Corp. 654 N.Y.S.2d 866, 868 (3d Dep’t 1997) (rejecting claims
of sex harassment and discrimination when plaintiff’s own affidavit stated that the cause of her
workplace difficulties was her complaints about smoking).
165. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 99D-1(a)-(b) (2014) (providing, inter alia, for civil cause of
action and providing for compensatory and punitive damages, court costs and attorneys’ fees to the
prevailing party, with the provision that a prevailing defendant may be awarded reasonable attorneys’
[sic] fees only upon a showing that the case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation). The
North Carolina Human Relations Commission may also bring a civil action on behalf of any genderviolence survivor, subject to his or her consent. Id. at § 99D-1(b)(1).
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(2) the alleged conspirators’ wrongful acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy and pursuant to a common scheme, and (3) a resultant
injury.166
North Carolina case law addressing claims brought by genderviolence survivors against their aggressors is limited. One decision held
that in order to sustain a claim, the plaintiff must allege and prove the
defendant’s intent to interfere with his or her constitutional right.167
However, in Zenobile v. McKecuen, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals ruled that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state an
interference-with-civil-rights claim based on the plaintiff’s “civil rights
as a woman.”168 The court recognized that the defendants conspired to
render the plaintiff physically helpless, stripped her naked, and filmed
her. They also destroyed evidence and harassed the plaintiff in an
attempt to make her drop the investigation.169
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As this review demonstrates, state civil rights remedies provide tools
to hold those who commit sexual violence accountable. They can apply
to cases of workplace sexual violence, since Title VII has been
interpreted not to apply to individuals.170 They can also hold those who
commit sexual and other forms of gender violence accountable in the
myriad other settings in which sexual violence causes economic,
psychological, and other harms to its targets. These laws can provide
relief for those who do not wish to engage with, or those who have not
been afforded relief through, the criminal justice system, although
engaging with the criminal justice system would not bar a civil claim.171
Yet the survey also reveals the relative dearth of reported decisions
166. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 666 S.E.2d 107, 115
(N.C. 2008). The aggressor’s prohibited conduct may include “use [of] force, repeated harassment,
violence, physical harm to persons or property, or direct or indirect threats of physical harm to persons
or property to commit an act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.” N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
99D-1(a)(2) (2017).
167. For example, in Alexander v. Diversified Ace Servs. II, Luanesha Alexander, an employee of
Diversified Ace Services II, brought a civil action alleging sexual harassment and gender-based violence
as well as allegations of a conspiracy to “interfere with” her right to work in an environment “free of
sexually abusive and discriminatory conduct”. No. 1:11CV725, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, *2-4, 3133 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 7, 2014). The court rejected the claim for failure to “sufficiently identif[y]” the
survivor’s constitutional right that the aggressor had conspired to violate. Id. at *33-38.
168. 548 S.E.2d 756, 760 (N.C. App. 2001).
169. Id.
170. See supra note 3.
171. Notably, a number of the statutes enacted as part of their state’s “bias-crime” laws explicitly
provide a civil cause of action regardless of whether the case led to a criminal prosecution or conviction.
See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-3704 (2018); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-7.1(c) (2018); Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.147b(3) (2018); Minn. Stat. § 611A.79(3) (2018); Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13 § 1457 (2018).
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interpreting those laws. Some of the reported decisions interpret
procedural issues, such as the statute of limitations or whether the suit
was precluded by the state’s employment discrimination law, and do not
shed much light on their substance.172 Importantly, a number of
decisions easily recognize that allegations of sexual assault, or
comments and epithets reflecting gender bias, stated a claim.173 By
contrast, other decisions dismissed claims for failing to adequately
allege a predicate act of violence sufficient to satisfy the statute.174 This
case law suggests that statutes seeking to fill gaps and provide relief for
gender-based violence define the predicate act broadly to capture the
range of acts or series of acts that are the basis for gender-based
violence and intimidation.
Although suits seeking individual liability may not be a feasible
strategy in all cases,175 they remain a critical component of a
comprehensive accountability scheme. At least some of the barriers to
private suits against individuals in tort law do not apply since, for
example, most of these laws provide attorneys’ fees to the prevailing
party.176 Moreover, these laws hold transformative power to shift norms
172. For cases dismissing claims based on, inter alia, a conclusion that the predicate acts fell
outside the applicable statute of limitations, see, e.g., Adams v. Jenkins, No. 115745/03, 2005 WL
6584554, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 22, 2005); Cordero v. Epstein, 869 N.Y.S.2d 725 (N.Y. 2008); Gottwald
v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5202 (N.Y. Apr. 6, 2016). For cases concluding
that workplace sexual harassment claims must be brought under state antidiscrimination laws, see Doe
v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563 (1996).
173. See, e.g., F.P. v. Monier, 405 P.3d 1076 (Cal. 2017); Doe v. Starbucks, Inc., No. SACV 080582 AG CWX, 2009 WL 5183773 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009); Smith v. Farmstand, No. 11-CV-9147,
2016 WL 5912886 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2016); Zamudio v. Nick & Howard LLC, No. 15 C 3917, 2015
WL 6736679 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2015); Flores v. Santiago, 986 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); Johnson
v. David, No. 12-CV-1038-SCW, 2017 WL 1090811 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2017); Myers v. City and Cty.
of San Francisco, No. C 08-1163 MEJ, 2012 WL 4111912 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012); Hern v. McEllen,
No. A125358, 2011 WL 2112538 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 2011); O’Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686
(1987); Wood v. U.S., 760 F. Supp. 952 (D. Mass. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1122 (1st
Cir. 1993) (en banc); Rinsky v. Boston University, No. 10cv10779-NG, 2010 WL 5437289 (D. Mass.
Dec. 27, 2010); but cf, e.g., Gottwald, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5202 (finding insufficient allegations of
gender-motivation); Hughes v. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(finding the same).
174. See, e.g., Monier, 405 P.3d 1076; Harper v. Lugbauer, No. 11-CV-01306-JST, 2014 WL
1266305 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014), aff'd, 709 F. App'x 849 (9th Cir. 2017); Greenwald v. Bohemian
Club, Inc., No. C 07-05261 WHA, 2008 WL 2331947 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008); Ramirez v. Wong, 188
Cal. App. 4th 1480 (2010); Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1268 (2017); Caldwell v.
Fed. Express Corp., 908 F. Supp. 29 (D. Me. 1995).
175. See Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3, at 768-70 (explaining that suits against
individuals may be less frequently made than those against institutions due to, inter alia, defendants’
limited financial resources, survivors’ lack of interest in re-engaging with an abuser, lack of access to
counsel).
176. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 52(b), 52.4(a) (2015); D.C. Code §22-3704 (2009); 740 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 82/15 (2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12—7.1(c) (1995); 5 M.R.S.A. § 4683 (2018)
(Maine); M.G.L.A. ch. 12 § 11H (2014) (Massachusetts’ civil rights act); Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.147b(3)(b) (2018); Neb. Rev. St. § 28-113(1) (2018); N.J. Stat. § 2A:53A-21(d)(1) (2015); N.Y.
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by framing gender violence in terms of civil rights, rather than private,
individualized harm.177
The recent rise in visibility of sexual abuse by individuals holding
powerful positions highlights the importance of creating meaningful
legal schemes for accountability and of framing sexual and other forms
of gender-based violence as the civil rights violations that they are. State
civil rights remedies can be more widely used to redress harm and
advance accountability–they should not be overlooked as we advance
legal and social change to promote equality, dignity, and justice for all.

Civ. Rights L. § 79-N (4) (2014); N.Y.C. Admin. Code Tit. 8, Ch. 9 § 8-904 (2000); N.C. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 99D-1(a)-(b) (2014); Rockland Cty. Admin. Code 279-4(A)(3) (2001); Tenn. Stat. § 4-21-701
(2017); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1457 (2014); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.083 (2017); Westchester
County, NY., Code of Ordinances § 701.01 (2001).
177. Goldscheid, Meaningful Paradigm, supra note 3, at 756-67.
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APPENDIX A

California

Illinois

States (or local
jurisdictions)
modeled after
VAWA civil rights
remedy with
Morrison-style civil
rights remedy

States (or local
jurisdictions) with
Civil Action for
Gender Violence as
Part of Bias-Crime
or civil rights
Statute

Cal. Civil Code §
52.4 (2002)

Cal. Civ. Code 51.7
(2015)

740 ILCS 82/1, et
seq. (West 2004)

Iowa

Cal. Civ. Code 52(b)
ILCS 5/12-7.1(c)
(2018)
I.C.A. § 729A.5
(West 1992)

Maine
Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota

M.S.A. § 611A.79
(2014)

Nebraska
New Jersey

New York

New York City,
N.Y., Code Tit. 8,
Ch. 9 §§ 8-901 et seq.
(2000)
County of
Westchester, §
701.01 et seq. (2001)
Rockland Cty.
Admin. Code 279-3
(2001)

M.G.L.A. 12 § 11H,
I, J (2014)
M.G.L.A. ch. 266 §
127B (2018)
M.G.L.A. ch. 93 §
102 (2018)
M.C.L.A. §
750.147b (2014)
M.S.A. § 611A.79
(2014)
Neb.Rev.St. § 28113 (2014)
N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A21 et seq. (2015)
N.Y. Civ. Rights L.
§ 79-n (McKinney
2015); N.Y. Civ.
Rights L. § 40-c
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States (or local
jurisdictions)
with Civil
Action for
Violating other
Civil Rights
Cal. Civ. Code
51.7(a) (Ralph
Act)
720 ILCS 5/127.1 (1995)

5 M.R.S.A. §
4682 (2014)
M.G.L.A. 12 §
11H, I, J (2014)
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States (or local
jurisdictions)
modeled after
VAWA civil rights
remedy with
Morrison-style civil
rights remedy

States (or local
jurisdictions) with
Civil Action for
Gender Violence as
Part of Bias-Crime
or civil rights
Statute

North Carolina

Tennessee
Vermont

Washington
Washington,
D.C.
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States (or local
jurisdictions)
with Civil
Action for
Violating other
Civil Rights
N.C.G.S.A. §
99D-1(a)-(b)
(2014)
(conspiracy to
interfere with
civil rights)

Tenn. Stat. § 4-21701 (2017)
(malicious
harassment statute)
Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit.
13, § 1457 (2014)
RCWA § 9A.36.083
(2017)(malicious
harassment)
CS ST § 22-3704
(2009)
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